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III.

STATEMENT OF THE CASE

A.

Statement of Facts

Silver Creek Seed, LLC ("Silver Creek") is owned and operated by Mark Johnson
("Johnson"), and in the business of growing seed potatoes. (See Tr. Vol. I, p. 199, L. 19 top.
200, L. 12 and p. 203, LL 5-11. 1) Growing seed potatoes involves cutting early generations of
potatoes into small pieces, planting the cut pieces in the spring, harvesting the resulting crop in
the fall, and then storing the crop through the winter until the spring when the potatoes are either
sold or cut/planted again. (See generally Tr. Vol. I, p. 200, L. 11 top. 203, L. 3.) Prior to Silver
Creek's involvement with Sunrain Varieties, LLC ("Sunrain"), Silver Creek never had any issues
with the potato disease caused by Clavibacter michiganensis subs. Spedonicus (referred to as
"bacterial ring rot" or "BRR"). (R. Vol. I, p. 66-2.)
Prior to the 2011 growing season, Sunrain approached Silver Creek with the prospect of
Silver Creek growing seed potatoes for Sunrain. (Tr. Vol. I, p. 205, LL 7-21.) Silver Creek
proceeded to grow seed potatoes for Sunrain in 2011. (Tr. Vol. I, p. 205, LL 22-23.) Following
the 2011 season, the parties agreed that Silver Creek would again grow multiple seed varieties
for Sunrain during 2012. (Tr. Vol. I, p. 206, LL 15-20.) The terms of that agreement were set

1 For purposes of this brief, "Tr. Vol. I" refers to the Reporter's Transcript on Appeal reported by Susan P. Isreal.
"Tr. Vol. 11" refers to the Transcript on Appeal reported by Cathereine L. Pavkov.
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forth in a written contract executed by representatives of Silver Creek and Sunrain on May 10,
2012 (the "Contract"). (Tr. Vol. I, p. 206, L. 18 top. 207, L. 24; Plaintiffs Exh. 5, pp. 2-3.)
Pursuant to the Contract, Sunrain agreed to 1) provide specific varieties of its proprietary
certified seed potatoes, the 84180, Red Fantasy, Laura, Annabelle, Rumba, Allians, and Carrera
to Silver Creek to grow during the 2012 crop year, and 2) purchase the potatoes grown from such
seed (the "Potatoes") from Silver Creek after the 2012 crop year. (See R. Vol. I, pp. 66-2 to 663; Plaintiffs Exhibit 5.) The Contract also provided that the Potatoes would meet the
certification requirements of the State of Idaho, and that Silver Creek could not sell the Potatoes
to any other party without Sunrain's written consent. (Plaintiffs Exhibit 5, p. 2)
A portion of the seed from which the Potatoes were grown (including the 84180 variety)
was delivered to Silver Creek in the fall of 2011 and placed in storages Sunrain rented from
Silver Creek. (Tr. Vol. I, p. 209, LL 2-7 and p. 212, LL 2-10.) That seed was from a crop
grown by Sunrain in Nevada during 2011. Due to Sunrain's late harvesting of its Nevada crop,
the seed arriving at Silver Creek in the fall of 2011 was heavily frost damaged. (Tr. Vol. I, p.
214, L. 13 top. 215, L. 10.) Due to their poor condition, some of the seed broke down while in
Silver Creek's storages and was disposed of. (Tr. Vol. I, p. 215, L. 11 top. 216, L. 17.)
In the May of 2012, Silver Creek began planting the salvageable seed that Sunrain had
left in the storages, as well as other seed from Sunrain that Silver Creek received just before
planting. (See Tr. Vol. I, p. 209, LL 12-19 andp. 223, L. 9 top. 225, L. 14.) Silver Creek grew
the Potatoes during the 2012 growing season. (R. Vol. I, pp. 66-2 to 66-3.). After the 2012
harvest, Silver Creek placed the Potatoes in its storages until Sunrain was ready for them to be
shipped. (Tr. Vol. I, p. 232, L. 6 top. 233, L. 4; R. Vol. I, pp. 66-2 to 66-3.)
In March 2013, Sunrain sent trucks to Silver Creek's cellars, took delivery of some of the
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84180 variety (the "Wooten Potatoes"), and sold them to a third party farmer. (See Tr. Vol. I, p.
233, LL 3-4 and p. 235, LL 7-16; R. Vol. I, p. 66-4.) The Wooten Potatoes were visually
inspected and then certified by crop inspectors. (Tr. Vol. I, p. 237, LL 15-17; R. Vol. I, p. 66-4.)
On or about March 29, 2013, a sample from the remaining 84180 potatoes tested positive
for BRR. (Tr. Vol. I, p. 236, LL 2-25; R. Vol. I, p. 66-3.) Silver Creek and Sunrain discussed
the positive test result at that time. (R. Vol. I, p. 66-3.) The apparent source of the BRR can be
traced to a farm in Washington state. Specifically, Ebe Farms, LLC ("Ebe Fanns") grew the 2nd
generation of the 84180 variety in Washington in 2010. (R. Vol. I, p. 66-2.) Thereafter,
Potandon Produce, Inc., Sunrain's parent corporation, imported the 84180's from Ebe Farms and
provided them to Sunrain, which grew the 3rd generation of 84180 in Nevada during 2011. (R.
Vol. I, p. 66-2.) In October 2011, Sunrain shipped the 84180s from Nevada to Silver Creek for
storage. (R. Vol. I, p. 66-2.) On November 18, 2011, potatoes from Ebe Farms tested positive
for BRR. (R. Vol. I, p. 66-2; Plaintiff's Exhibit 13.) However, Sunrain never told Silver Creek
that the 84180's came from a farm that was infected with BRR. (R. Vol. I, p. 66-2.)
After the 84180s tested positive for BRR in March 2013, Silver Creek initiated extensive
testing on all of the Potatoes. (See Tr. Vol. I, p. 239, L. 5 top. 240, L. 9.) On April 3, 2013,
Silver Creek sent 1,500 tuber samples of the 84180 variety; 2,200 tuber samples each of the Red
Fantasy, Laura, Annabelle, Rumba, and Allians varieties; and 400 tuber samples of the Carrera
variety to Agdia and North Dakota State University for PCR testing. (R. Vol. I, p. 66-3; Tr. Vol.
I, p. 239, L. 5 top. 240, L. 9.) The 84180 and Rumba varieties (collectively, the "Infected
Potatoes") tested positive for BRR, while the Red Fantasy, Laura, Annabelle, Allians, and
Carrera varieties (collectively, the "Clean Potatoes") tested negative for BRR. (Tr. Vol. I, p.
240, L. 10 top. 241, L. 12; R. Vol. I, p. 66-3.)
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After Sunrain knew of the positive tests for BRR in the Infected Potatoes, Sunrain again
sent trucks to Silver Creek's storages and took delivery of the majority of the remaining Potatoes
(collectively, but excluding the Infected Potatoes, the "Remaining Potatoes"). (Tr. Vol. I, p. 244,
L. 4 top. 245, L. 8; R. Vol. I, p. 66-4.) Thereafter, Sunrain sold the Remaining Potatoes that it
picked up to a third party as cattle feed and retained the proceeds. (See Tr. Vol. I, p. 293, L. 15
top. 302, L. 8; R. Vol. I, p. 66-4.) Silver Creek sold the Remaining Potatoes that Sunrain did not
pick up to a third party as cattle feed pursuant to Sunrain's orders. (See Tr. Vol. I, p. 292, L. 6 to
p. 293, L. 8.) Silver Creek received the proceeds from the sale of the Potatoes that it sold at
Sunrain's direction. (Tr. Vol. I, p. 293, LL 9-13.)
Despite taking delivery of, and selling to third parties, the Wooten Potatoes and most of
the Remaining Potatoes (and also directing Silver Creek to sell the remainder of the Potatoes as
cattle feed), Sunrain refused to pay Silver Creek in full under the Contract. (R. Vol. I, p. 66-4.)

B.

Course of Proceedings

Silver Creek filed a complaint against Sunrain alleging that Sunrain breached the
Contract, as well as implied warranties, with relation to the seed potatoes Sunrain sold to Silver
Creek. (R. Vol. I, pp. 15-25.) Sunrain answered and counter-claimed, alleging that Silver Creek
breached a contract with Sunrain by not paying for the seed potatoes that Sunrain delivered to
Silver Creek in the springs of2012 and 2013. (R. Vol. 1, pp. 26-37.)
Silver Creek moved for partial summary judgment with regards to the Wooten Potatoes
and the Clean Potatoes. (R. Vol. 1, pp. 46-47.) After a hearing on the matter, the Court held
that Sunrain was liable to Silver Creek under the Contract for the Wooten Potatoes and the Clean
Potatoes. (R. Vol. I, pp. 123-25.) Sunrain subsequently moved for reconsideration of that
decision. (R. Vol. I, pp. 174-75.) While Sunrain's motion for reconsideration was pending,
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Silver Creek made a second motion for partial summary judgment, which second motion dealt
with the issue of the quantity and Contract rate for the seed potatoes Sunrain was held liable for
in the District Court's order on the first motion for partial summary judgment. (R. Vol. I, pp.
178-79.) The motion to reconsider and the second motion for partial summary judgment were
heard together, after which the District Court denied both motions. (R. Vol. III, pp. 428-29.)
The case then proceeded to a jury trial. The trial commenced on February 24, 2015, and
lasted four days. (See R. Vol. I, pp. 7-8.) Before the case was submitted to the jury, Sunrain
moved for a directed verdict on Count 2 of its counterclaim (dealing with seed Sunrain delivered
to Silver Creek in 2013). (Tr. Vol. I, p. 791, LL 10-14.) Because Silver Creek did not dispute
receiving the seed, or the value of the seed, the District Court decided to inform the jury not to
concern themselves with Count 2 of the counterclaim, and that the District Court would account
for that amount when it came time to enter judgment in the case. 2 (See Tr. Vol. I, p. 791, L. 10
top. 802, L. 16.) Thereafter, the jury returned a unanimous verdict finding:
Silver Creek was owed $678,828.60 under the Contract for the seed potatoes that were
the subject of Silver Creek's first motion for summary judgment;
The Rumba and undelivered 84180 seed potatoes Sunrain sold to Silver Creek were
infected with bacterial ring rot at the time of their transfer from Sunrain to Silver Creek;
Sunrain breached an implied warranty of merchantability with regards to the Rumba and
undelivered 84180 seed potatoes that were infected with bacterial ring rot at the time of
their transfer from Sunrain to Silver Creek;
Sunrain breached an implied warranty of firtness for a particular purpose with regards to
the Rumba and undelivered 84180 seed potatoes that were infected with bacterial ring rot
at the time of their transfer from Sunrain to Silver Creek;
Silver Creek was owed $81,910.50 in damages for the breach of the implied warranties;
Sunrain accepted the Rumba and undelivered 84180 seed potatoes from Silver Creek;
Silver Creek was owed $81,910.50 in damages for Sunrain's acceptance of the Rumba
and undelivered 84180 seed potatoes;
The total amount of damages owed to Silver Creek was $760,738.76 3; and
2 After the trial, the District Court entered an order granting Sunrain's motion for directed verdict on Count 2 of the
counter-claim. (R. Vol. III, pp. 601-03.)
3 A review of Question No. 8 on the Verdict Form suggests that the jury made a mathematical error when totaling
the amount owed to Silver Creek-the sum should have been $760,739.10. (See R. Vol. III, p. 592.)
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Silver Creek did not owe Sumain any amount for potatoes delivered to Silver Creek for
the 2012 growing season.
(R. Vol. III, pp. 590-93.)
Silver Creek then sought prejudgment interest on the amounts owed from Sumain. (R.
Vol. III, pp. 594-98.) The District Court offset the principle amount owed to Silver Creek by
$62,879.70 (the u..11.disputed amount of Count 2 of Sunrain's counterclaim) and then granted
Silver Creek prejudgment interest in the amount of $139,034.58. (R. Vol. III, pp. 601--02; R.
Vol. IV, pp. 604-05.) Judgment in Silver Creek's favor was entered in the amount of
$836,893.46, and Count 1 of Surnain's counterclaim was dismissed. (R. Vol. III, pp. 599-600.)
After entry of the Judgment, Silver Creek requested an award of costs and attorney fees
as the prevailing party in the litigation. (R. Vol. IV, pp. 681-751.) Sumain objected to the
request for attorney fees and costs, filed a Notice ofAppeal, and also filed a Rule 60(b) motion
seeking relief from the District Court's Judgment based on a renewed argument that Silver Creek
was not entitled to prejudgment interest. 4 (R. Vol. IV, pp. 757-68.) After a hearing on the
motions, the District Court denied Sumain's Rule 60(b) motion. (See Tr. Vol. II, p. 12, L. 15 to
p. 15, L. 6.) The District Court took under advisement Silver Creek's request for an award of
costs and attorney fees. (Tr. Vol. II, p. 32, LL 3-5.) The District Court ultimately found Silver
Creek the prevailing party and awarded Silver Creek its costs and attorney fees. (R. Vol. IV, pp.
783-92.) A Supplemental Judgment of $279,132.21 (representing such costs and attorney fees)
was entered by the District Court. (R. Vol. IV, pp. 795-96.) After the District Court decided
various motions related to enforcement of the judgments, the case proceeded on appeal.

4

Sunrain also filed numerous motions seeking to stay proceedings to enforce the Judgment, as well as filings
objecting to, and seeking to undo, Silver Creek's successful collections efforts. (See R. Vol. I, pp. 10-13.)
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IV.

ADDITIONAL ISSUES PRESENTED ON APPEAL

1. Is Silver Creek entitled to costs and attorney fees on appeal?
V.

ARGUMENT

1. Did the District Court err by denying Sunrain's Motion to Reconsider?
On Silver Creek's Motion for Partial Summary Judgment, Sumain attempted to create an
issue of material fact by submitting affidavits asserting that, after learning of the positive test for
BRR Sunrain rejected all of the Potatoes except those already delivered to third parties, and that
Sumain' s sale the Potatoes as cattle feed was part of a new agreement separate and apart from
the Contract. (See generally R. Vol. I, pp. 67-75.) Recognizing such allegations as conclusory,
overly generalized, and inadequately supported, Silver Creek moved to strike those portions of
the affidavits. (See generally R. Vol. I, pp. 92-93, 109-113.)
The District Court reviewed in detail the affidavits, noting the lack of adequate
foundation for admitting into evidence certain testimony contained therein. (See generally Tr.
Vol. I, p. 10, L. 2 top. 17, L. 24.) The District Court illustrated specific instances of conclusory
statements in the affidavits and the missing information needed to make such statements
admissible. (Tr. Vol. I, p. 10, L. 2 top. 17, L. 24.) The District Court then struck the deficient
portions of the affidavits relating to the alleged rejection. (Tr. Vol. I, p. 17, L. 21 top. 18, L. 1.)
Under Idaho's adoption of the Uniform Commercial Code ("UCC"), a buyer must
affirmatively reject tendered goods in order to avoid acceptance. Idaho Code §§ 28-2-602 cmt. 1

& 28-2-606(l)(b). After striking the deficient portions of Sumain's affidavits, there was no
evidence before the District Court that Sumain rejected any of the Potatoes. Sumain's counsel
admitted such at the hearing on the motion. (Tr. Vol. I, p. 37, LL 3-18.) Consequently, the
District Court correctly concluded Sunrain owed the contract price for the Potatoes.
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Thereafter, Sunrain filed its Motion to Reconsider. With that motion, Sunrain sought to
remedy its previously deficient arguments and evidence by arguing that the Potatoes did not
conform to the Contract, as well as providing deposition testimony and further argument related
to the alleged rejection of the Potatoes. (See R. Vol. I, pp. 126-173.) A few days later, Silver
Creek filed its 2nd Motion for Partial Summary Judgment, which related to the quantity and price
of the Potatoes Sumain was liable for. (See generally R. Vol. I, p. 178 to R. Vol. II, p. 306.) In
response, Sunrain filed a combined memorandum opposing the 2nd Motion for Partial Summary

Judgment and supplementing its Motion to Reconsider, along with various affidavits, including
one from Lisa Swenson, Sumain's treasurer (the "2nd Swenson A.ff"). (See R. Vol. II, pp. 32060.) The

2nd Motion for

Partial Summary Judgment and Motion to Reconsider were heard

together, and the District Court denied both motions. (See Tr. Vol. I, pp. 54-123; R. Vol. III, pp.
428-29.) As set forth below, the District Court did not err by denying the Motion to Reconsider.

a. The Clean Potatoes met the seed quality standards of the Contract.
The rights and liabilities of parties under a contract are established and limited by the
terms of their contract. Pern v. Stocks, 93 Idaho 866,868,477 P.2d 108, 110 (1970). A breach
of contract occurs when there is non-performance of any contractual duty of immediate
performance. Indep. Lead Mines v. Hecla Mining Co., 143 Idaho 22, 28, 137 P.3d 409,415
(2006). Whether there has been performance or a breach of contractual obligations is determined
by review of the contract because a contract must be given effect and enforced according to its
terms. See Borchert v. Hecla Min. Co., 109 Idaho 482,485, 708 P.2d 887, 890 (1985).
When reviewing a contract to determine the parties' liabilities, the contract as a whole is
examined to ascertain the intention of the parties. Taylor v. Just, 138 Idaho 137, 140, 59 P.3d
308, 311 (2002). Additionally, courts construe a contract against the person who prepared it.
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Straub v. Smith, 145 Idaho 65, 69, 175 P.3d 754, 758 (2007). "If a contract's terms are clear and

unambiguous, the contract's meaning and legal effect are questions oflaw, and the meaning of
the contract and intent of the parties must be determined from the plain meaning of the contract's
own words." Id. (emphasis added). Consequently, courts must focus on the terms of the actual
contract, not terms that one party later realizes it wanted included in the contract.
Sunrain arguments are premised on the assumption that the Contract called for
recertifiable seed that could be used to produce future generations of certified seed potatoes.
However, the Contract makes no mention of recertification or seed fit for producing future
generations of certified seed potatoes. Sunrain prepared the Contract from a common form it
uses when dealing with seed potatoes growers, (see R. Vol. II, p. 385), and could have included
wording or terms related to recertification if that is what it intended or required.
Instead, the Contract begins by reciting,
Whereas, Sunrain wishes to secure a secure, clean source of certified potato seed
of Proprietary varieties, for Sunrain's/ 2013 commercial planting seasons, AND
Whereas, Silver Creek Seed L.L.C. is in the business to supply certified potato
seed.

(Plaintiffs Exhibit 5, p. 1) (bold in original, underlined emphases added). Commercial growing
of potatoes involves receiving certified seed which is then planted and grown with the resulting
potato crop sold as fresh pack potatoes or for processing. (See R. Vol. II, p. 386.) Commercial
growers do not replant potatoes that they harvest or sell the crop as seed to other growers, so the
ability to recertify seed supplied to a commercial grower is inconsequential.
Similarly, the Contract provision detailing the quality standards for the Potatoes required
that the seed meet the Idaho "certification requirements." (Plaintiffs Exhibit 5, p. 2) (emphasis
added). There was no requirement that the seed be recertifiable or meet the requirements for use
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in producing future generations of certified potato seed.
The Contract's terms are plain and unambiguous, and those terms govern whether there
was a breach in this case. There are no terms in the Contract from which one can objectively
infer that the ability to recertify the Potatoes was a term of the Contract. The requirements of the
Contract are plain and clear-the Contract explicitly calls for Silver Creek to grow and provide
Sunrain with certified seed potatoes (not recertifiable seed) for use in commercial planting.
Accordingly, the Potatoes conformed to the Contract's quality standards so long as they met the
requirements for certification (without regard to whether they could be recertified).
The Idaho Crop Improvement Association ("ICIA") is oversees seed potato certification
in Idaho. ICIA' s seed potato certification rules provide the following definitions:
1. Certification
The attaching of the official Idaho certification tag to a sack or bulk container
of seed potatoes certifies the potatoes have met the Idaho Rules of
Certification....
2. Certified Seed
Potatoes that have met the Idaho Rules of Certification and have been
inspected and certified for grade by the Idaho Federal-State Inspection Service
and found to meet the grade requirements for certified seed at the time of
inspection.

7. Recertification
The process of certifying a seed lot that was certified the previous year.

9. Seed Lot
A field or a group of fields producing seed potatoes or the potatoes (tubers)
harvested from a seed potato field, identified with a certification number and a
North American Plant Health Certificate, enabling identity preservation and
tracking.
10. Contact Lot
A seed lot produced on a farming operation using common production and
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handling equipment and/or storage facilities.

(R. Vol. I, p. 66-55 to 66-57.)
As apparent from those definitions, there is a difference between certification and
recertification of seed potatoes. That difference can be illustrated by looking at a single variety
of the Potatoes. After the 2011 harvest, Sunrain delivered to Silver Creek G2 (2nd generation)
Allians that were grown during 2011. Silver Creek cut and grew the G2 Allians during 2012.
The resulting potato crop, harvested in the fall of 2012, were G3 (3rd generation) Allians.
The G2 Allians were given a certification number when certified after the 2011 season.
After the G2 Allians were planted and grown in 2012, the resulting crop of G3 Allians would
have received a different certification number if certified. 5 Certification of the G3 Allians
would have been a recertification of the G2 Allians from which they were grown. If the G3
Allians were replanted and grown during 2013, the resulting G4 Allians would receive their own
certification number if certified, that certification would be a recertification of the G3 Allians.
Pursuant to ICIA rules, a seed lot infected with BRR is not eligible for certification. (R.
Vol. I, p. 66-59.) As such, the Potatoes that tested positive for BRR could not be certified.
However, contact lots are not doomed to suffer the same fate as infected lots. The ICIA rules
provide that all contact lots "shall remain eligible for certification provided that a laboratory test
is negative for bacterial ring rot prior to final certification." (R. Vol. I, p. 66-71) (emphases
added). The laboratory test is to be done on a random sample of 1,200 stems or tubers for seed
lots that are ten acres or larger. 6 (R. Vol. I, p. 66-71.)
The effect of the aforementioned provisions on the Potatoes in this case can be easily
illustrated by returning to the prior example of the Allians variety grown by Silver Creek during
5

That certification never took place because Sunrain decided to simply sell the Potatoes as cattle feed.

6 For seed lots less than ten acres the sample size is determined by the certification agency. (R. Vol. I, p. 66-71.)
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2012. The G3 Allians grown during 2012 were not infected with BRR, so they were not
automatically disqualified from certification. Rather, because the G3 Allians were a contact lot
of the Infected Potatoes, the G3 Allians remained eligible for certification if they passed
laboratory testing. The foregoing conclusion is not affected by the provisions disqualifying the
G3 Allians from recertification. Recertification of the G3 Allians would not take place until their
daughter potatoes were grown and then certified after the 2013 season.
After discovering that the 84180 variety it had grown during 2012 was infected with
BRR, Silver Creek sent 1,500 tuber samples of the 84180 variety; 2,200 tuber samples each of
the Red Fantasy, Laura, Annabelle, Rumba, and Allians varieties; and 400 tuber samples of the
Carrera variety (a smaller overall lot) to Agdia and North Dakota State University for testing.
(R. Vol. I, p. 66-3.) The Clean Potatoes all tested negative for BRR. (R. Vol. I, p. 66-3.) Thus,
per the ICIA rules, the Clean Potatoes remained eligible for certification despite the presence of
BRR in the 84180 and Rumba varieties, and could have been used to grow a commercial crop
during the 2013 season. 7
As previously noted, the Contract did not call for Silver Creek to provide Sunrain with
recertifiable seed for use in growing future crops of certified seed potatoes. The Contract only
called for Silver Creek to provide certified potato seed for use in commercial planting during
2013. By passing the laboratory testing, the Clean Potatoes were eligible for certification and
could have certified in the spring of 2013 and then used for commercial planting that year.
Therefore, the Clean Potatoes met the Contract's quality requirements. There was no evidence
which would have raised an issue of material fact on this point. As a result, the District Court

7 While the Clean Potatoes remained eligible for certification, they would not be eligible for recertification in 2013
(i.e., a crop grown from the Clean Potatoes during 2013 could not be certified).
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did not err in ruling that the Clean Potatoes conformed to the Contract's quality requirements. 8
Further, to the extent the District Court correctly ruled that the Clean Potatoes conformed
to the Contract, any rejection of the Clean Potatoes by Sunrain (as it alleges it did) would be
wrongful. In the case of a wrongful rejection, Silver Creek would be entitled to recover under
the Contract for the wrongfully-rejected Clean Potatoes. See Idaho Code §§ 28-2-703 & 28-2708. Therefore, if this Court upholds the finding that the Clean Potatoes conformed to the
Contract's quality requirements any error with regard to whether there was a question of fact as
to if Sunrain "rejected" the Potatoes would be harmless because Sunrain would still owe the
Contract price even if it rejected the Clean Potatoes (due to such rejection being wrongful). 9
b. The undisputed evidence established, as a matter of law, that Sunrain did not
unequivocally reject the Potatoes, and instead accepted the Potatoes.

To reject goods, a buyer must notify the seller of such rejection within a reasonable time
after their delivery or tender. Idaho Code § 28-2-602. A mere expression by the buyer that the
goods are nonconforming does not operate as a rejection. Figueroa v. Kit-San Co., 123 Idaho
149, 158, 845 P.2d 567, 576 (Ct. App. 1992). Rather, to avoid accepting goods "the buyer must
take affirmative action to avoid acceptance." Id. at 157 (citing Idaho Code§ 28-2-602 cmt. 1).
Courts interpret the UCC's requirement that the buyer must take affirmative action to
avoid acceptance as requiring buyers to unequivocally or unambiguously notify sellers of any
rejection. See e.g., T. J Stevenson & Co., Inc. v. 81,193 Bags of Flour, 629 F.2d 338 (5th Cir.

8 Silver Creek does not dispute that the Contract also requires the Potatoes to meet certain size requirements;
however, Silver Creek's first motion for partial summary judgment only concerned whether the Potatoes "met the
certification requirements of the parties' contract." (R. Vol I., p. 51.) The amount of Potatoes conforming to the
Contract's requirements (i.e., were certifiable, met size requirements, etc.) was considered in Silver Creek's 211d
Motion for Partial Summary Judgment, which was denied. (See generally R. Vol. I, pp. 178-200; R. Vol. II, pp.
201-306; R. Vol. III, pp. 428-29.) The amount of Potatoes that meet the Contract's size requirements, the yield per
acre for the various varieties/generations, etc. was ultimately decided by the jury and is not challenged on appeal.
9 Harmless errors are disregarded on appeal. Vendelin v. Costco Wholesale Corp., 140 Idaho 416,426, 95 P.3d 34,
44 (2004).
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1980) (the UCC presumes acceptance of goods unless the seller is unequivocally and seasonably
notified that the goods are rejected); CMI Corp. v. Leemar Steel Co., Inc., 733 F.2d 1410, 1414
(10th Cir. 1984) ("Seasonable notice of rejection requires that a buyer give the seller clear and
unambiguous notice of his rejection."); HCI Chemicals (USA), Inc. v. Henkel KGaA, 966 F.2d
1018 (5th Cir. 1992) (buyer's rejection of goods under be clear and unambiguous). Idaho courts
also appear to hold that the UCC requires clear, unequivocal notice of rejection. See G & H
Land & Cattle Co. v. Heitzman & Nelson, Inc., 102 Idaho 204,209,628 P.2d 1038, 1043 (1981)

(noting the buyer's rejection was "absolute and unequivocal").
Given the requirement for unequivocal notice ofrejection, a buyer's mere expressions
that goods do not conform to the contract requirements do not equate to a rejection of the goods.
See Figueroa, 123 Idaho at 158, 845 P.2d at 576; Beal v. Griffin, 123 Idaho 445,450, 849 P.2d

118, 123 (Ct. App. 1993) (buyer informing seller of damaged goods and inquiring how the
problem would be addressed was not notification ofrejection). Buyers failing to make effective
rejection of goods are deemed to have accepted the goods. Idaho Code § 28-2-606(1 )(b).
Additionally, a buyer can accept goods despite the goods' failure to conform to the
contract. Idaho Code§ 28-2-601. Idaho's adoption of the UCC specifically provides that
(1) Acceptance of goods occurs when the buyer
(a) after a reasonable opportunity to inspect the goods signifies to the
seller that the goods are conforming or that he will take or retain them in spite of
their nonconformity; or
(b) fails to make an effective rejection (subsection (1) of section 28-2602), but such acceptance does not occur until the buyer has had a reasonable
opportunity to inspect them; or
(c) does any act inconsistent with the seller's ownership; but if such act is
wrongful as against the seller it is an acceptance only if ratified by him.
(2) Acceptance of a part of any commercial unit is acceptance of that entire unit.
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Id § 28-2-606. With respect to subsection (l)(c), acts inconsistent with the seller's ownership,
or communications of acceptance, bind the buyer to accepting the goods despite any prior
insistence that the goods were rejected. Id. 28-2-606 cmt. 4.
"A buyer's actions which are inconsistent v,,ith seller's ownership are 'many and varied'
and include 'making payments, taking possession of the goods, use of the goods, repairing,
working on them, attempts to resell them, and dealing with them in other varied ways.' "

Chancellor Dev. Co. v. Brand, 896 S.W.2d 672,676 (Mo. Ct. App. 1995) (quoting J. WHITE &
R. SUMMERS, UNIFORM COMMERCIAL CODE§ 8-2, at 398 (3d ed. 1988)). This Court
has specifically found that when a buyer resells delivered goods for profit or as part of its
business, the buyer's actions constitute acceptance of the goods. Borges v. Magic Valley Foods.

Inc., 101 Idaho 494, 496-97, 615 P.2d 273, 275-76 (1980) (buyer's resale of goods for profit is
inconsistent with the seller's ownership of the goods); see also Bicknell v. Owyhee Sheep & Land

Co., 31 Idaho 696, 176 P. 782, 783-84 (1918) (if buyer offers to sell goods which he has
contracted to purchase, buyer's actions constitute acceptance). Likewise, a buyer may signify his
acceptance of delivered goods by receiving, keeping, appropriating goods to his own (or his
business') use. Mohr v. Shultz, 86 Idaho 531,538,388 P.2d 1002, 1007 (1964).
In the context of potatoes, knowingly taking delivery of nonconforming potatoes,
reselling such potatoes, and/or failing to reject deliveries of such potatoes constitutes acceptance
of the potatoes. See e.g., Borges, 101 Idaho at 496-97, 616 P.2d at 275-76; Lickley v. Max

Herbold, Inc., 133 Idaho 209,212, 984 P.2d 697, 700 (1999); G & H Land & Cattle, 102 Idaho
at 209-10, 628 P.2d at 1043-44. For example, in Borges a potato grower contracted to sell a
certain amount of potatoes to a purchaser who planned to then ship the potatoes as fresh pack
grade. Borges, 101 Idaho at 495,616 P.2d at 274. The contract provided that it was void if the
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potatoes were unfit for fresh pack shipping. Id. After inspecting the potatoes, it was discovered
that a portion of them suffered from a defect that prevented them being able to be shipped under
the fresh pack grade. Id. Nonetheless, the buyer took possession of all of the potatoes. See id.
After a failed attempt to blend the affected potatoes with good potatoes in hopes that the blend
would meet fresh pack grade standards, the buyer processed the affected potatoes into flakes and
sold them for substantially less than the contract price. Id. at 496,616 P.2d at 275. This Court
held that the buyer's "use of the potatoes in the ordinary course of its own business (presumably
for profit) was an act inconsistent with the seller's ownership, and constituted an acceptance of
the goods." Id. at 497,616 P.2d at 276; see also Lickley, 133 Idaho at 212, 984 P.2d at 700
(buyer accepted potatoes by taking delivery of truck-loads of potatoes and comingling them with
other potatoes it had bought). The present appeal involves similar circumstances.
Silver Creek and Sunrain entered into the Contract pursuant to which Silver Creek would
grow the Potatoes and then sell them to Sunrain. (See Plaintiff's Exhibit 5.) The Contract
provided that the Potatoes must meet certain quality standards. (Plaintiff's Exhibit 5, p. 2.) The
Potatoes were to be stored in facilities owned by Silver Creek and Sunrain was to take delivery
of the Potatoes with its trucks at Silver Creek's storages. (See Plaintiff's Exhibit 5, pp. 1-2.).
In 2012, Silver Creek cut, grew, harvested, and then stored the Potatoes in its storages as
called for by the Contract. (R. Vol. I, pp. 66-2 to 66-3.) In early March 2013, Sunrain's trucks
arrived at Silver Creek's storages to take possession of the Wooten Potatoes. (R. Vol. I, pp. 664.) Sunrain's trucks then took the Wooten Potatoes away from Silver Creek's storages and sold
those seed potatoes to another farmer. (See R. Vol. I, p. 66-4.) There is no dispute that the
Wooten Potatoes were accepted by Sunrain.
On or about March 29, 2013, Silver Creek and Sunrain learned that the 84180 variety
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were infected with BRR. (R. Vol. I, pp. 66-3.) Seed potatoes with BRR cannot be certified and
did not meet the quality standards called for in the Contract. Sunrain was aware of tlie positive
test for BRR in the 84180 variety on or about March 29, 2013, and thus knew at that time that the
84180 variety, and potentially all of the Potatoes (in the event contact lots did not pass laboratory
testing), may not be certifiable. (See R. Vol. I, pp. 66-3.)
After learning that BRR affected some of the Potatoes, Sunrain took delivery of the
majority of the Remaining Potatoes as called for by the Contract. (See R. Vol. I, pp. 66-4.)
Sunrain knew that some of the Potatoes were infected with BRR and that it was possible that
none of the Potatoes would conform to the Contract (and Sumain strenuously argues that it had
even rejected the Potatoes). Nevertheless, Sumain exercised dominion over the Remaining
Potatoes by taking delivery of those seed potatoes and selling them to third parties, just as it had
done with the Wooten Potatoes and the Infected Potatoes. 10
It was undisputed that Sunrain took delivery of the majority of the Remaining Potatoes.
It was undisputed that at the time Sumain took delivery of those potatoes, Sunrain knew of the

presence of BRR in some of the Potatoes. It was undisputed that Sumain sold the potatoes to
third parties. It was undisputed that Sunrain retained the sale proceeds.
Additionally, after taking and reselling the Remaining Potatoes, Sunrain then made
partial payment for those potatoes. The 211d Swenson A.ff was prepared by the person responsible
for the Sumain's financial dealings and payment of accounts. (R. Vol. II, pp. 324-37.) That
affidavit set forth that in April 2013 (after discovery of the BRR) Silver Creek invoiced Sumain
for the second deposit on the Potatoes due under the Contract. (R. Vol. II, p. 326.) The affidavit
explains that in May 2013 (after discovery of the BRR, after the alleged rejection of the Potatoes,
10

The jury found Sunrain accepted the Infected Potatoes by taking delivery of those seed potatoes and selling them
to third parties-just as it had done with the rest of the Potatoes. (See R. Vol. III, p. 591, Question No. 6.)
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and after Sunrain took and sold most of the Remaining Potatoes) Sunrain paid $175,000 to Silver
Creek for that invoice. (R. Vol. II, p. 326.) The

2nd Swenson

A.ff. explained in detail how

various portions of that $175,000 payment were on account of the varieties and generations of
potatoes that made up the Potatoes. (R. Vol. II, pp. 326-27.)
On appeal, Sunrain minimizes the 2nd Swenson A.ff. by arguing that its explanation of the
payment was an irrelevant, internal allocation. 11 However, on Sunrain's Motion to Reconsider
the payment was not presented as an internal allocation or guess as to how the payment might be
spread among the Potatoes. Such argument and testimony did not appear until trial after Sunrain
realized the effect of the

2nd Swenson

Aff. comments relating to Sunrain's payments toward the

Potatoes after learning of the BRR. On reconsideration, the evidence plainly stated that the
$175,000 payment made after discovery of the BRR was divided amongst the different varieties
of the Potatoes and payment in response to invoicing from Silver Creek.
Sunrain's actions of taking possession, selling, and then making payments on the
Remaining Potatoes control over any prior insistence or indication that that Sunrain rejected the
Remaining Potatoes. See Idaho Code § 28-2-606 cmt. 4. Likewise, Sunrain's use and/or resale
of the Remaining Potatoes-and its retention of the proceeds from such use and/or sale--was
inconsistent with Silver Creek's ownership of the Remaining Potatoes constituted acceptance of
the Remaining Potatoes under Idaho law. Id. § 28-2-606(1)(c); Borges, 101 Idaho at 497,616
P.2d at 276. Despite claims by buyers that they had rejected goods, numerous courts have relied
on uncontroverted facts to hold that a buyer accepted goods as a matter of law-especially when
such evidence is of acts inconsistent with the seller's ownership of the goods. See. e.g., Fiat

Auto US.A., Inc. v. Hallums, 363 S.E.2d 312 (Ga. App. 1987); Hawke Distrib., Inc. v. Nuevo Sol
11

Sunrain also suggests that the $175,000 payment was not related to Silver Creek's invoicing Sunrain for the
Potatoes (see App. Br. pp. 14, 19), despite the 2nd Swenson A.ff explicitly stating to the contrary.
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Partners, Inc., 689 So. 2d 1202 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1997); Toshiba Mach. Co., Am. v. SPM Flow
Control, Inc., 180 S.W.3d 761 (Tex. App. 2005); Franklin v. Augusta Dodge, Inc., 652 S.E.2d

862 (Ga. App. 2007); Connecticut Inv. Casting Corp. v. Made-Rite Tool Co., 416 N.E.2d 966
(Mass. 1981); Eagle Mfg. Co. v. Arkell & Douglas, 189 N.Y.S. 140 (App. Div. 1921).
On reconsideration, it was undisputed that Sunrain took possession of, sold, and then
made payments on the Remaining Potatoes. The District Court could rule on the legal effect of
those actions. The District Court explained how those actions, as a matter of law, resulted in an
acceptance of the Remaining Potatoes (regardless of whether they conformed to the Contract).
(Tr. Vol. I, pp. 107-12.) That well-reasoned decision was in accord with the law. Thus, the
District Court did not err in denying Surnrain's Motion for Reconsideration.

c. Any error in granting partial summary judgment was harmless because Sunrain
breached the Contract and is liable for the Contract price for the Potatoes.
Even assuming, arguendo, that the Potatoes did not conform to the Contract, or that there
was as question of fact that precluded the District Court from entering summary judgment on the
issue of acceptance/rejection of the Potatoes, any error occasioned by the District Court's Order
on Plaintiff's Amended Motion for Partial Summary Judgment (upheld on reconsideration) is

harmless in light of the jury's finding that seed from which the Potatoes were grown was infected
at the time Sunrain delivered it to Silver Creek.
Error not affecting a substantial right of the parties is considered harmless and is
disregarded on appeal. Vendelin, 140 Idaho at 426, 95 P.3d at 44. Likewise, "[w]here final
judgment of the district court is entered upon an erroneous or different theory, it will be upheld
on the correct theory." Johnson v. Gorton, 94 Idaho 595,598,495 P.2d 1, 4 (1972). Applying
these principles to the facts of this case, any error by the District Court's in deciding that Sunrain
owes Silver Creek the price in the Contract for the Potatoes was harmless because the same
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result would be proper under other principles of contract law.
Specifically,
[t]he doctrine of prevention of performance excuses a party from fulfilling his
contractual obligations when the party to whom the obligation is owed unlawfully
prevents the first party from tendering performance. The party whose
performance has been prevented may be entitled to damages for the benefit of the
bargain that would have been earned through performance.
Ferguson v. City of Orofino, 131 Idaho 190, 193, 953 P .2d 630, 633 (Ct. App. 1998) (citations
omitted). Similarly, the implied covenant of good faith and fair dealing is one that is implied by
law in the contract between parties. Idaho Power Co. v. Cogeneration, Inc., 134 Idaho 738, 750,
9 P.3d 1204, 1216 (2000). This covenant requires that the parties perform the obligations in their
agreement in good faith. Id. The covenant is violated when a party "violates, nullifies or
significantly impairs any benefit of the contract." Id. Violations of the implied covenant are
breaches of the contract entitling the non-breaching party to contract damages. See Idaho First
Nat. Bank v. Bliss Valley Foods, Inc., 121 Idaho 266,289, 824 P.2d 841, 864 (1991).
If Sunrain is correct that the presence of BRR in the Infected Potatoes resulted in all of
the Potatoes not conforming to the Contract's requirements (whether because they could not be
certified, or because the Contract called for recertifiable seed), such failure is Sunrain' s fault.
After much testimony, including from two of the world's foremost experts on BRR, the jury
concluded that the Rumba and 84180 seed was infected with BRR when delivered to Silver
Creek. 12 (R. Vol. III, p. 591.) It was the detection of BRR in potatoes grown from that infected
seed that Sunrain alleges cause the Potatoes to be non-conforming and render Sunrain not liable
for the Potatoes (as well as entitled to reject the Potatoes).
Working backwards, the cause of any non-conforming Potatoes was Sunrain. The
12

Sunrain has not put forth any argument that such a finding was in error, and, in any event, such finding is clearly
supported by the evidence presented at trial, including the testimony and expert opinion of Dr. Neil Gudmestad.
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Potatoes are allegedly non-conforming due to the presence of BRR in the Infected Potatoes (and
its effect on the ability to recertify the Potatoes). Pursuant to the Contract, the Potatoes were to
be grown from seed provided by Sumain. Sumain provided Silver Creek with the seed from
which the Potatoes were grown. The jury concluded that the seed provided by Sumain was
infected with BRR at the time it was delivered to Silver Creek. As a result, it was Sunrain's
providing BRR infected seed to Silver Creek that led to the presence of BRR in the resulting
Potatoes.
Sunrain's providing BRR infected seed to Silver Creek-and the Contract's requirement
that Silver Creek use that seed to grow the Potatoes-destroyed Silver Creek's ability to raise all
of the Potatoes to be free of BRR. Thus, to the extent the presence of BRR rendered the Potatoes
non-conforming under the Contract, Silver Creek was prevented from successfully performing
under the Contract by Sumain's providing infected seed. Said another way, Sunrain impaired
Silver Creek's ability to perform under the Contract and receive the benefits of such performance
(i.e., payment of the Contract price for the Potatoes).
Sunrain prevented/impaired Silver Creek's ability to perform and benefit from the
Contract. As a result, Silver Creek is entitled to recover damages for the benefit of the bargain
that it would have received through performance. Such damages include payment of the rate
contained in the Contract for the Clean Potatoes. That is the same conclusion and outcome
ordered by the District Court upon its granting of partial summary judgment to Silver Creek.
Further, the damages actually awarded by the jury pursuant to the District Court's decision on
partial summary judgment was the rate contained in the Contract for the Potatoes. Therefore,
any error occasioned by District Court's grant of partial summary judgment (upheld on
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reconsideration) was harmless. 13

2. Did the District Court err by omitting the blue tags from evidence?
The primary issues that arise regarding admission of evidence is whether the evidence is
relevant and had supported by proper foundation. Slack v. Kelleher, 140 Idaho 916, 921, 104
P.3d 958, 963 (2004). Relevant evidence is that with "any tendency to make the existence of any
fact that is of consequence to the determination of the action more probable or less probable than
it would be without the evidence." I.R.E. 401. Irrelevant is inadmissible. I.R.E. 402. Whether
evidence is relevant is an issue oflaw. Slack, 140 Idaho at 921, 104 P.3d at 963.
Whether there is adequate foundation for proffered evidence is a preliminary question of
admissibility. State v. Bell, 115 Idaho 36, 40, 764 P.2d 113, 117 (Ct. App. 1988); I.R.E. 104.
"Whether or not a proper foundation has been laid for the admission of the evidence is a
discretionary decision to be made by the trial court." Slack, 140 Idaho at 921, 104 P.3d at 963.
On appeal, a trial court's discretionary decisions regarding whether to admit evidence can only
be reversed when there was an abuse of discretion. Van Brunt v. Stoddard, 136 Idaho 681,686,
39 P.3d 621,626 (2001). Alleged abuses of discretion are analyzed with a three-part inquiry:
"whether the district court (1) correctly perceived the issue as one of discretion; (2) acted within
the outer boundaries of its discretion and consistently with the legal standards applicable to the
specific choices available to it; and (3) reached its decision by an exercise ofreason." Sun Valley

Potato Growers, Inc. v. Texas Refinery Corp., 139 Idaho 761, 765, 86 P.3d 475,479 (2004).

13 Also, despite unexplained arguments to the contrary, any error in the District Court's grant of partial summary
judgment did not prejudice the entire trial and require retrial of all issues. Whether the Potatoes conformed to the
Contract or were accepted/rejected by Sunrain is wholly unrelated to the jury's finding that the Rumba and
undelivered 84180 seed potatoes Sunrain sold to Silver Creek were infected with BRR at the time of their transfer
from Sunrain to Silver Creek. Similarly, whether or not the Potatoes conformed to the Contract or Sunrain
accepted/rejected them has no beari11g on whether Sunrain breached implied warranties by delivering infected seed
to Silver Creek (as well as the amount of Silver Creek's damages on account of that seed). Those issues are not
related or dependant on the grant of summary judgment, and Sunrain has not challenged the jury's findings.
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a. There was no evidence that blue tags' terms were part of the parties' agreement.
When Sunrain first attempted to enter its Exhibit Y (which included the back of a seed
potato certification tag, also known as a "blue tag") into evidence, Silver Creek objected on a
number of bases, including lack of foundation. (Tr. Vol. I, p. 320, LL 21-23.) Silver Creek
asserted that the Sunrain had not provided adequate foundation as to whether the seed potatoes at
issue ever had a blue tag issued for them or when the blue tag was issued. (Tr. Vol. I, p. 320, LL
21-23.) After a discussion with the parties, it was determined that the District Court would
return to the issue of Exhibit Y being admitted. (Tr. Vol. I, p. 322, LL 2-12.)
In an attempt to remedy the lack of foundation for Exhibit Y, Sunrain then later again
revisited the issue during its case in chief. 14 However, Sunrain still had not presented evidence
that any of the Exhibit Ys were signed by Johnson. Likewise, there was no fotmdation that the
Exhibit Y s were copies of the of the tags that might have been with the seed potatoes received by
Silver Creek, as well as no evidence that the language on the Exhibit Y s was the same as the
language on any tags that Silver Creek might have received.
Additionally, Sunrain was seeking to admit the contents of the Exhibit Ys as a
substantive part of the parties' agreement. (Tr. Vol. I, p. 572, LL 14-15.) This Court has held
that the provisions printed on the back of blue tags are nothing more than attempts by strangers
to unilaterally interject terms into a previously-formed contract between a buyer and a seller.

14

To explain the references to various versions of"Exhibit Y," Silver Creek would note that it also objected to
Exhibit Y because that document was never provided in discovery. (Tr. Vol. I, p. 320, LL 6-8.) Sunrain first
asserted that Exhibit Y was shown to Johnson at his deposition, (Tr. Vol. I, p. 321, LL 4-19), but later explained that
it was mistaken and that a different copy (a blank copy) of Exhibit Y was used at Johnson's deposition, (Tr. Vol. I,
p. 340, LL 2-6). Sunrain later offered as a substitute for Exhibit Y copies of the blank blue tag which was shown to
Johnson during his deposition, which substitute was labeled Defendant's Exhibit Yl. (Tr. Vol. I, p. 567, L. 25 top.
568, L. 23.) During argument about whether to admit Exhibit Yl, Sunrain provided the District Court with a third,
more legible copy of a blue tag, which third copy the District Court had labeled as Exhibit Y2 and included in the
record for clarity as to the wording on Exhibit Yl. (See generally Tr. Vol. 1, p. 572, L. 18 top. 575, L. 2.) For
purposes of this brief, Exhibit Y, Exhibit Yl, and Exhibit Y2 are referred to collectively as the "Exhibit Ys."
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Duffin v. Idaho Crop Imp. Ass'n, 126 Idaho 1002, 1012, 895 P.2d 1195, 1205 (1995). The

provisions found on the blue tags simply do not become terms of a contract by virtue of being
attached to loads of delivered seed potatoes. Id. To even consider whether the provisions apply,
there must be evidence that the buyer and seller intended to include the provisions as, or
understood them to be, part of their agreement. See id. Thus, even if adequate foundation was
laid that the Exhibit Ys adequately represented any of the actual tags Silver Creek might have
received (there was not), there would still have to be foundation that the Exhibit Ys' terms were
part of the parties' agreement. The District Court specifically noted this requirement when
discussing whether the Exhibit Ys could be admitted. (Tr. Vol. I, pp. 602-03, LL 22-01.)
There was absolutely zero evidence that the parties ever discussed the terms found on the
Exhibit Ys-let alone agreed to make them part of their agreement. Sunrain's own evidence
indicated that the parties never discussed including Exhibit Ys' terms in their agreement.
Sunrain's business manager, Aron Derbidge ("Derbidge"), testified that Sunrain assumed that
Silver Creek received blue tags, read the tags, understood the tags, and agreed to the conditions
and terms on the tags. (Tr. Vol. I, p. 660, LL 6-20.) Ifthere was discussion and agreement
between the parties regarding these points, there would be no need for such assumptions.
Additionally, Johnson twice explained that he does not even understand the legal terminology
on the Exhibit Ys, and expressly stated that he does not "use [blue tags] as a legal document."
(Tr. Vol. I, p. 584, LL 13-16 and p. 591, LL 12-15.)
After being presented with much testimony and argument, 15 the District Court ultimately
decided that there was not adequate foundation presented suggesting that the terms on the
Exhibit Ys were part of the Contract. (Tr. Vol. I, p. 598, LL 21-25 and p. 602, L. 22 top. 603, L.

15

See generally Tr. Vol. I, pp. 319-21, 339-42, 568-603, 652-71.
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22.) That conclusion was a well-reasoned, discretionary decision reached by the District Court
after much argument and consideration.

b. Usage of trade did not modify the parties' express Contract.
After it became apparent that Sunrain could not establish foundation that the Exhibit Y s
were part of the parties' agreement, Sunrain then argued that the terms on the blue tags became
part of the agreement due to usage of trade. (See generally Tr. Vol. I, pp. 652-71.) Silver
Creek's pointed out that due to the express terms of the Contract, the provisions found on the
Exhibit Ys were irrelevant in this case. (See Tr. Vol. I, p. 662, LL 2-9 and p. 666, LL 12-23.)
Applicability or relevance of usages of trade (such as the terms on the Exhibit Ys-if they were
usages of trade) in this case was a legal issue on which the District Court could decide.
Because the parties had a written contract embodying their agreement, the applicability of
the Exhibit Ys to that agreement involved various layers of legal considerations by the District
Court. To begin, the question of whether an ambiguity exists in a contract is a matter oflaw to
be decided by the courts. Knipe Land Co. v. Robertson, 151 Idaho 449,455,269 P.3d 595, 601
(2011 ). Likewise, the effect of an unambiguous contract is also decided by courts as a matter of
law. Id. Evidence used to give meaning to a contract is only presented to a jury after a court
finds that the contract is ambiguous. Id. Consequently, it is proper to not allow introduction of
custom or usage evidence which contradicts the terms of an unambiguous contract. Cool v.

Mountainview Landowners Coop. Ass 'n, 139 Idaho 770, 773, 86 P.3d 484,487 (2004).
Long before adoption of the UCC, it was a well settled rule in Idaho that "where the
terms of a contract are plain and unambiguous, they cannot be varied or contradicted by evidence
of usage or custom." Gramkow v. Farmers' Co-Op. Irr. Co., 47 Idaho 578,277 P. 431,432
(1929). This Court has further expounded on the subject by explaining,
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The broad general rule is that proof of a valid usage or custom is admissible to
annex incidents to a written instrument, to aid in its construction, and to ascertain
the intention of the parties in reference to matters about which the contract is
silent, provided such usage or custom is not contradictory of or inconsistent with
the plain terms of the written agreement and its effect is not to add to or ingraft
any new agreement or stipulation thereon. * * * Evidence of usage and custom is
not, however, admitted for the purpose of varying or contradicting the plain terms
of an unambiguous contract, and will not be permitted to overturn the agreement
between the parties. Evidence of custom is permitted for the purpose of
ascertaining the meaning of a contract where otherwise ambiguous or uncertain of
providing for incidents not in contradiction of the fundamental provisions of the
contract, and of supplying omissions under certain circumstances which have
occurred in the agreement of the parties
Commercial Ins. Co. v. Hartwell Excavating Co., 89 Idaho 531,540,407 P.2d 312, 316-17
(1965) (emphasis added). With regards to usages in specific trades, the basic premise of the
aforementioned rules applies-usages of trade are only incorporated into a contract when the
parties do not indicate anything to the contrary. Id.
The UCC notes that usages of trade may be relevant when seeking to understand specific
terms of the parties' agreement, and can even supplement or qualify such terms. Idaho Code §
28-1-303(d). However, application of usages of trade in such a manner is only reasonable when
the express terms of the agreement are consistent with the usage of trade. Id. at§ 28-l-303(e).
To the extent there is an inconsistency between the agreement's express terms and a usage of
trade, the express terms of the agreement trump the usage of trade. Id. at§ 28-1-303(e)(l).
The limitations ofldaho Code§ 28-1-303(e) respect the well-established, pre-UCC
concepts discussed above. This Court has relied on such statute when holding that "[u]sage of
trade cannot supplant the express terms of a contract." Swanson v. Beco Const. Co., Inc., 145
Idaho 59, 65, 175 P.3d 748, 754 (2007). Regardless of whether a usage of trade is established or
not, it does not apply in cases where it conflicts with express terms of the parties' agreement. Id.
In this case, the Contract provided, "This instrument contains the entire Agreement
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between the parties and supersedes any prior agreement, written or oral, between them and shall
not be modified except by an agreement in writing executed by all parties." (Plaintiffs Exhibit
5, p. 4) (emphases added). That provision's meaning is simple; terms that are not contained in
the written Contract are not part of the parties' agreement and do not modify, or become part of,
the Contract unless in writing and signed be all parties.
The District Court correctly viewed Sunrain's attempts to have the terms of the Exhibit
Ys apply in this case as impressing a new term of the parties' contract. Sunrain was not seeking
admission of the Exhibit Ys (and any usages of trade associated therewith) to explain or qualify a
term of the Contract. Sunrain's was admittedly offering the Exhibit Ys to be included as a
substantive term of the parties' agreement in the form of a limitation/waiver of warranties, as
well as a limitation ofremedies. (Tr. Vol. I. pp. 570-71, LL 22-07, p. 572, LL 11-15 and p. 597,
LL 1-08.) Seeking to add to or modify the Contract by adding terms not contained in the written
agreement (and not signed by the parties) is clearly at odds with Paragraph 14 of the Contract.
Furthermore, applying the terms contained on the back of the blue tag to the parties'
agreement (as a usage of trade) would be inconsistent with the express terms of the Contract.
The back of the blue tags provide, "By acceptance of these seed potatoes, buyer expressly agrees
that the disclaimer of warranty and limitation of remedy and liability set forth herein are express
conditions of the sale, and that they constitute the entire, exclusive and final agreement between
the parties regarding warranty, liability or remedy." (Defendant's Exhibits Y, Yl, Y2)
(emphasis added). However, the Contract contains a provision entitled "Warranty and
Limitations of Liability," which sets forth various warranties made by the parties and limits
damages that may be recovered in the event of a breach. (Plainti:ff s Exhibit 5, pp. 3-4.)
Clearly, the terms set forth on the back of the Exhibit Ys stating that the disclaimers and
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limitations contained on the blue tags are the "entire, exclusive and final agreement regarding
warranty, liability or remedy" are inconsistent with the terms of the written Contract that include
different terms regarding warranties, liability and remedies. The UCC provides that in such a
situation including the conflicting usages of trade as terms of the agreement is not reasonable and
the usages of trade are trumped by express contract terms. Idaho Code§ 28-l-303(e).
Finally, the Contract was executed on May 10, 2012. The Contracts terms provide, "This
instrument contains the entire Agreement between the parties and supersedes any prior
agreement, written oral, between them and shall not be modified except by an agreement in
writing executed bv all parties." (Plaintiffs Exhibit 5, p. 4) (emphases added). There was no
evidence that any tags arrived after the execution of the Contract. Further, there was no evidence
that any of tags that may have arrived at Silver Creek were signed by all of the parties.
Therefore, the Contract superseded any terms that were allegedly part of the agreement between
the parties due to their inclusion on blue tags arriving prior to the Contract being signed on May
10, 2012. Likewise, any blue tags that may have arrived after the Contract was signed on May
10, 2012, did not modify the Contract because the tags were not signed by the parties.
As apparent from the preceding paragraphs, the factual background from this case is
significantly distinguishable from Duffin, 126 Idaho 1002, relied upon by Sumain. The contract
between the buyer and seller in Diifjin was a verbal contract. See id at 1005, 895 P.2d at 1198.
Accordingly, there was no written contract explicitly proclaiming that the terms contained in that
writing were all of the terms the parties had agreed to. Likewise, there was no mention of any
part in the parties' verbal contract related warranties, liability and remedies that might conflict
with the terms found on blue tags.
The present case involves both a written contract containing the entire agreement of the
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parties and how that agreement could be modified, as well as unsigned blue tags containing
terms inconsistent with the Contract. There is not any factual determination needing to be made
in this case regarding what the terms of the parties' contract were. The written Contract plainly
sets forth the parties' entire agreement and how it could be modified. Provisions-such as those
on the blue tags-not contained the Contract and not signed by all the parties are not applicable
in this case. The inapplicable provisions are irrelevant were properly excluded from evidence.
c. The limited remedy in the blue tags fails of its essential purpose in the case of
latent defects in seed potatoes.
Idaho Code§ 28-2-719(2) provides, "Where circumstances cause an exclusive or limited
remedy to fail of its essential purpose, remedy may be had as provided in this act." This
provision is to ensure that a party receiving defective goods is not prevented from obtaining a
remedy that substantially affects the value of the buyer's bargain. Clark v. Int 'l Harvester Co.,
99 Idaho 326,340,581 P.2d 784, 798 (1978).
In the context of defective seed, a remedy limited to return of the purchase price of the
seed is hardly a remedy at all. As explained by one court,
unlike many products (i.e., a television, stereo, etc.) that can repaired or replaced
which would actually make the buyer whole and otherwise fulfill the purpose of
the contract and related warranties, simply replacing seeds or refunding the price
of seeds in the agricultural context is totally inadequate. Rather, the farmer's sole
purpose in purchasing seeds is to harvest a crop from those seeds. The true value
of the seeds only comes from the crop yielded which is preceded by considerable
time and cost expended by the farmer. A farmer's lost growing season and the
accompanying loss of expected profits due to defective seeds clearly is not
compensated by simply replacing or refunding the price of the defective seeds.
Nomo Agroindustrial Sa De CV v. Enza Zaden N Am., Inc., 492 F. Supp. 2d 1175, 1181-82 (D.
Ariz. 2007). Similar reasoning has been employed by numerous courts to invalidate remedies
limited to return of purchase price of seed in similar circumstances. See e.g., Mullis v. Speight
Seed Farms, Inc., 505 S.E.2d 818 (Ga. App. 1998) (limited remedy ofreturn of purchase price
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for defective seed unenforceable because the farmer is without a remedy for another's breach);

Lutz Farms v. Asgrow Seed Company, 948 F.2d 638,646 (10th Cir.1991) (remedies limited to
replacement of defective seeds failed of its essential purpose and was unconscionable); Schmaltz

v. Nissen, 431 N.W.2d 657, 662 (S.D.1988) (limiting damages to replacement cost of seed
unconscionable because "[a] loss of yield from an intended crop due to inferior seed is
inevitable, and [Plaintiff] should not be left without a remedy."); Latimer v. William Mueller &

Son, Inc., 386 N.W.2d 618, 625 (Mich. App. 1986) ( remedy limited to replacement of defective
seed "is an illusory one which represents no remedy at all"); Corneli Seed Co. v. Ferguson, 64
So.2d 162 (Fla.1953) (limitation excluding consequential damages was unconscionable where a
seed defect was latent and not apparent until after harvesting).
The conclusions of the aforementioned authorities are especially applicable in the case of
seed potatoes. All seed potatoes delivered or distributed in Idaho for planting must be certified.
Idaho Code § 22-503. Consequently, if all certified seed potatoes are subject to a limited remedy
ofreturn of the purchase price (because a blue tag was attached to the loads/containers in which
they are delivered, or by some usage of trade) there would never be an adequate remedy for
growers in Idaho who receive defective or infected seed. Potato growers would be required to
invest months of time and tens of thousands of dollars in labor, equipment, and other resources
raising a crop with only hope that the seed used was good (or as warranted). If the seed was not
as warranted, it would be too late for the grower to remedy the problem and receive the benefit
for which the seed was purchased. Further, the farmer could not recoup the significant expenses
invested in the crops due the seed tag's remedy limitation.
In this case, the agreement between Sunrain and Silver Creek involved Sunrain providing
specific seed potatoes to Silver Creek. Sunrain provided the seed and Silver Creek did not get to
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select the seed. Silver Creek was also restricted to selling the resulting crop to Sunrain only, due
to the proprietary nature of the seed. (See Silver Creek Exhibit 5.)
Considering the foregoing provisions, if the limitation of remedy argued for by Sunrain
applied Silver Creek would not receive the benefit of the parties' agreement and be left without
an effective remedy for its resulting loss. Return of the purchase price for the infected seed
would not compensate Silver Creek for its expenditures of preparing, growing, harvesting, and
storing the Potaotes. Return of the purchase price for the infected seed would not allow Silver
Creek the opportunity to receive the benefit of the Contract. Once the problem with the seed was
discovered, there was no feasible way for Silver Creek to replace the seed and then perform, and
benefit from, the Contract. Likewise, Sunrain controlled how the Potatoes were salvaged. Silver
Creek could not get what it bargained for even if Sunrain was the only party at fault. Therefore,
a remedy limited to return of the seed's purchase price fails of its essential purpose.

3.

Did the District Court err by admitting certain testimony pertaining to the presence
of BRR on Ebe Farms?
a. Bragg's testimony regarding Ebe Farms testing positive for BRR was not
hearsay.
Hearsay is "a statement, other than one made by the declarant while testifying at the trial

or hearing, offered in evidence to prove the truth of the matter asserted." I.R.E. 80l(c). "A
'statement' is (1) an oral or written assertion or (2) nonverbal conduct of a person, if it is
intended by the person as an assertion." I.R.E. 80l(a). Hearsay "does not encompass all out-ofcourt-statements, but only those which are offered in evidence 'to prove the truth of the matter
asserted."' State v. Agundis, 127 Idaho 587,594,903 P.2d 752, 759 (Ct. App. 1995) (citing
I.R.E. 801 (c)). Out-of-court statements not offered to prove the truth of any matter asserted
therein are not hearsay. State v. Harris, 141 Idaho 721, 726, 117 P.3d 135, 140 (Ct. App. 2005).
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In this case, the statements alleged as hearsay by Sumain involved testimony of its
former employee, Jeff Bragg ("Bragg"), regarding the presence of BRR on Ebe Farms. Bragg
was asked "Greg Ebe himself called you and told you about ring rot on his farm?" (Tr. Vol. I p.
502, LL 9-10.) As apparent from that question, Silver Creek was not offering the statements
regarding Ebe Farm's testing positive for BRR to prove that Ebe Farms did have BRR. The
statements were offered to show that Sumain (specifically, its point of contact with Silver Creek)
was on notice that a source of its seed was infected with BRR.
Further, regardless of the reason for why Bragg's statement was offered, the statement
was not hearsay because it did not involve any out-of-court statement. As an answer to the
question about whether Greg Ebe himself had called Bragg, Bragg stated "Yes, because that's
what you do when you're a good producer. You lay it on the line to your clients." (Tr. Vol. I, p.
502, LL 21-22.) That answer contains no out-of-court statement by someone other than Bragg.

It was simply Bragg testifying at trial as to who called him-it was not Bragg testifying that
"Greg Ebe said .... " Further, Bragg's statements are non-hearsay admissions by a party
opponent because they dealt with matters within the scope of his authority as an employee of
Sumain. See Mann v. Safeway Stores, Inc., 95 Idaho 732,739,518 P.2d 1194, 1201 (1974).
The next question asked of Bragg was "do you happen to recall when Greg told you
that?" (Tr. Vol. I, p. 502, LL 23-24.) Again, this questioning is not trying to prove that BRR
was found on Ebe Farms, but instead attempting to show when Sumain learned of the situation
with Ebe Farms. Further, Bragg's answer contains no out-of-court statement by someone else it was made in court and by Bragg (a party opponent).
As explained above, the testimony by Bragg regarding BRR and Ebe Farms was not
hearsay. The testimony elicited from Bragg was offered to show his knowledge about the
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situation involving BRR at Ebe Farms and when he learned about the situation. Bragg's
testimony was not offered to prove that Ebe Farms did test positive for BRR. 16 Further, any
assertions made by Bragg are admissible as admissions of a party opponent.
b. Any error in admitting Bragg's testimony regarding BRR at Ebe Farms was
harmless.
Even assuming, arguendo, the District Court erred in admitting over objection certain
testimony regarding BRR on Ebe Farms, such error was harmless and does not warrant
disturbing the jury's verdict. It is well established principle that appellate courts will consider
admission of improper evidence harmless "if there is other competent evidence to the same effect
upon which a jury could reach the same result." Pacheco v. Safeco Ins. Co. ofAm., 116 Idaho
794, 798, 780 P.2d 116, 120 (1989). Harmless errors are disregarded on appeal. See Weinstein
v. Prudential Prop. & Cas. Ins. Co., 149 Idaho 299,310,233 P.3d 1221, 1232 (2010).

In this case there was ample evidence-including exhibits offered by Sunrain, testimony
from other Sunrain employees, and testimony from expert witnesses-regarding BRR on Ebe
Farms that was presented and admitted without objection from Sunrain. Uncontested testimony
regarding BRR on Ebe Farms began with the very first witness at trial. Johnson testified that
after the 84180s that Silver Creek grew tested positive for BRR, he immediately called Bragg
who told him the that seed "came from Ebe Farms in Washington and that they hadn't had
bacterial ring rot on that farm prior to getting the 84180s." (Tr. Vol. I, p. 238, LL 13-19.)
Sunrain did not object to that testimony.
Johnson later began testifying that he spoke to a person named Henry Gonzalez
("Gonzalez") from the Washington State Department of Agriculture, who sent Johnson some

The fact that Ebe Farms tested positive for BRR was already set forth in exhibits that Sunrain itselfpreviously
offered into evidence. (See generally Tr. Vol. I, p. 310, LL 17-21).
16
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documentation regarding Ebe Farms. (See generally Tr. Vol. I, p. 243, LL 2-7.) Sunrain made a
hearsay objection to Johnson's attempts to relay the contents of the documentation from
Gonzalez, and the District Court sustained that objection. However, on cross examination,
counsel for Sunrain began questioning Johnson about the discovery of BRR at Ebe Farms. The
testimony elicited by Sunrain from Johnson was that BRR was found at Ebe Farms. (See Tr.
Vol. I, p. 305, L. 24 top. 309, L. 3.)
Furthermore, counsel for Sunrain then presented Johnson with a copy of the
documentation Johnson received from Gonzalez regarding Ebe Farms, and began questioning
Johnson about its contents (despite previously objecting such as hearsay). (Tr. Vol. I, p. 309, L.
5 top. 311, L. 6.) Sunrain then moved to admit the documents, and the District Court admitted
them. (Tr. Vol. I, p. 310, LL 17-21.) Those documents, which were offered by Sunrain as an
exhibit, included a letter (with test results) from the ICIA to the Washington Department of
Agriculture regarding seed from Ebe Farms that the ICIA was commissioned to test for BRR.
(Plaintiffs Exhibit 13.) Those letters reported that the samples from Ebe Farms tested positive
for BRR. (Plaintiffs Exhibit 13.)
Silver Creek's expert, Dr. Neil Gudmestad, also testified that he reviewed testing
information showing that seed grown by Ebe Farms tested positive for BRR. (Tr. Vol. I, p. 356,
LL 13-19 & p. 364, LL 7-15.) Dr. Gudmestad went on explain that it was his expert opinion that
Ebe Farms was the most likely source of the BRR found in the Infected Potatoes. (Tr. Vol. I, p.
364, L. 7 top. 365, L. 21.) Sunrain never objected to Dr. Gudmestad's testimony regarding BRR
at Ebe Farms as hearsay. 17 Additionally, on cross examination counsel for Sunrain questioned

17

Experts are permitted to form opinions based in part upon hearsay (or other inadmissible evidence) so long as the
expert reaches his opinion based on his own independent judgment and explains the specific basis for that opinion.
See Doty v. Bishara, 123 Idaho 329, 336, 848 P.2d 387, 394 (1992).
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Dr. Gudmestad to specifically confirm that "the Ebe Farms positive testing for BRR was in
2011." (Tr. Vol. I, p. 395, LL 17-20.)
After Dr. Gudmestad's testimony, Sunrain called two of its own employees as witnesses,
and they also testified regarding BRR on Ebe Farms. Derbidge testified, without objection, that
Ebe Farms tested positive for BRR in 2011. (Tr. Vol. I, p. 636, LL 11-13.) Similarly, Doug
John testified, without objection, that he was aware that Ebe Farms tested positive for BRR. (See
Tr. Vol. I, p. 688, L. 23 top. 690, L. 5.)
As set forth above, even without Bragg's testminony there was ample evidence regarding
BRR being found on Ebe Farms and that Sunrain knew about the situation at Ebe Farms. Any
error occasioned by admitting Bragg's testimony related to BRR on Ebe Farms would be
harmless and should be disregarded on appeal.

4. Did the District Court err in instructing the jury?
When jury instructions are challenged on appeal, the Court looks to "determine whether
the instructions, as a whole, fairly and adequately present the issues and state the law. "

Vanderford Co. v. Knudson, 144 Idaho 547,555, 165 P.3d 261,269 (2007). "An erroneous
instruction does not constitute reversible error when the instructions taken as a whole do not
mislead or prejudice a party." Id.

a. Instruction Nos. 7-9 and 19 were proper in this case.
Jury Instruction Nos. 7, 8 and 19 simply inform the jury of the substance of the District
Court's decision on partial summary judgment (upheld on reconsideration). As set forth above,
the District Court did not err in reaching its decision (and if it did, it was harmless). Thus the
District Court did not err when instructing the jury with regard to Instruction Nos. 7, 8 and 19.
With regard to Instruction No. 9, that instruction dealt with certain Potatoes (i.e., the
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Infected Potatoes) that were not decided on partial summary judgment. This instruction simply
informs the jury what would constitute acceptance by Sunrain of the Infected Potatoes. The
actions constituting acceptance are clearly taken from Idaho Code § 28-2-606, the applicable
statue. The District Court did not err in instructing with regards to whether Sunrain accepted the
Infected Potatoes. Further, because the Infected Potatoes were not a part of the District Court's
decision on partial summary judgment, any reversal of that decision would not render Instruction
No. 9, its use in answering Question No. 6 on the Jury Verdict Form, erroneous.

b. The District Court correctly declined to instruct the jury on modification.
The Contract included a provision stating, "This instrument contains the entire
Agreement between the parties and supersedes any prior agreement, written or oral, between
them and shall not be modified except by an agreement in writing executed by all parties."
(Plaintiffs Exhibit 5, p. 4) (emphases added). This provision is plain and unambiguous as to
how any modification of the Contract could occur-only by a writing signed by all parties.
Without a signed writing, the Contract could not modified. Sunrain provided no evidence
of a writing signed by all parties purporting to modify the Contract. Thus, there was no
enforceable modification of the Contract. Because there was no enforceable modification, there
was no reason for the District Court to instruct the jury on the issue.

c. The District Court did not err when instructing the jury on latent defects.
Sunrain incorrectly asserts that there was no evidence presented suggesting that BRR was
latent in the Potatoes at the time of sale. On the contrary, as detailed above, there was ample
evidence that BRR was found on Ebe Farms (from which Sunrain obtained some of the seed that
eventually made its way to Silver Creek). Further, Dr. Gudmestad testified that BRR is a disease
that can remain latent for years. (Tr. Vol. I, p. 358, LL 5-23, p. 364, LL 1-3.) He also testified
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that once BRR is in a seed lot, you cannot get rid of the disease in that lot. (Tr. Vol. I, p. 357, LL
20-23.) Dr. Gudmeastad explained that the level of BRR infection in the Infected Potatoes could
not have come from an infection originating on Silver Creek's farm, and that the negative test
from 2012 (Defendant's Exhibit AA) has a sixty-seven percent chance of being a false negative.
(T. Vol. I, p. 356, L. 1 top. 368, L. 5, p. 377, L. 10 top. 378, L. 9.) Finally, Dr. Gudmestad
testified that based on his review of related documentation, his expert opinion was that Ebe
Farms was the most likely source of the BRR in the Potatoes. (Tr. Vol. I, p. 361, LL 9-13, p.
364, LL 7-24.) Based on that testimony, the jury could conclude that bacterial ring was present
in the seed at the time Sunrain sold it to Silver Creek.
Instruction No. 12 fairly and adequately presented the law applicable in this case.
Additionally, evidence was presented from which the jury could conclude that BRR was latent in
the seed potatoes Sunrain sold to Silver Creek. Thus, the District Court did not err by giving
Instruction No. 12.

5. Did the District Court err by awarding preiudgment interest on the Judgment?
Idaho Code § 28-22-104 allows for prejudgment interest on: a) money due by express
contract; b) money after the same becomes due; c) money due on the settlement of mutual
accounts; and d) money due upon open accounts. Such interest shall either be at the rate fixed by
the contract, or, where not fixed, at the rate of twelve percent (12%) per annum. Id. at§ 28-22104(1). Awarding prejudgment interest is rooted in equitable principles of fully compensating a
party for their lost use of money during the pendency of an action. See Chenery v. Agri-Lines

Corp., 115 Idaho 281,289, 766 P.2d 751, 759 (1988). Additionally, contrary to Sunrain's
arguments (which lack support by Idaho authority), simply because a case involves breaches of
warranty does not preclude an award of prejudgment interest. Idaho appellate courts have
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upheld prejudgment interest awards in cases involving breaches of implied warranties. See e.g.,
Meldco, Inc. v. Hollytex Carpet Mills, Inc., 118 Idaho 265, 796 P.2d 142 (Ct. App. 1990)
(prejudgment interest allowed on a breach of the implied warranty of merchantability claim).
Prejudgment interest is properly awarded when the amount of damages claimed are
liquidated or capable of mathematical computation. Dillon v. Montgome1y, 138 Idaho 614,618,
67 P.3d 93, 97 (2003). A claim is liquidated or damages ascertainable-and prejudgment
interest proper on such claim-"if the evidence furnishes data which, if believed, makes it
possible to compute the amount with exactness, without reliance upon opinion or discretion."
Seubert Excavators, Inc. v. Eucon Corp., 125 Idaho 744, 750 n.2, 874 P.2d 555,561 n.2 (Ct.
App. 1993) af!d in part, rev 'din part, Seubert Excavators, Inc. v. Eucon Corp., 125 Idaho 409,
871 P.2d 826 (1994). A claim for goods and services to be paid for at an agreed rate is a type of
liquidated claim. Id.
Simply because a claim is disputed or litigated does not mean that damages
"unascertainable" for purposes of awarding prejudgment interest. Ross v. Ross, 145 Idaho 274,
277, 178 P.3d 639, 642 (Ct. App. 2007). Similarly, a party to a contract may not deviate or
frustrate the contract to create the appearance of an unliqudiated sum that would preclude an
award of prejudgment interest. Dillon, 138 Idaho at 618, 67 P.3d at 91 (dispute over value of
good after one party chose to not follow the valuation procedures set forth in the contract did not
preclude prejudgment interest because the contract laid out the process to determine the value of
the goods at issue). Because prejudgment interest can be awarded as a matter oflaw, a trial court
may compute and add statutorily-allowed prejudgment interest to the amount of a jury verdict.
See Black v. Darrah, 71 Idaho 404,410,233 P.2d 415,419 (1951).
In this case, the District Court could award Silver Creek prejudgment interest on amounts
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owed by Sunrain under the Contract because amounts due were readily ascertainable. The
Contract provided how to calculate the amounts due to Silver Creek. (Plaintiffs Exhibit 5, pp.
1-2.) Unlike the unknown price in Likely, 133 Idaho 209, cited by Sunrain, the applicable price
for the potatoes in the present case involves no discretionary determination. The Contract
provides three different rates (varying by generation and yield of each variety) that Sunrain was
to pay for the Potatoes. (Plaintiffs Exhibit 5, pp. 1-2.) The applicable rate was to be applied to
the weight of the Potatoes shipped pursuant to the Contract. (Plaintiffs Exhibit 5, pp. 1-2.)

It was determined that Sumain owed Silver Creek the Contract price for all of the
Potatoes. (See R. Vol. I, pp. 123-25; R. Vol. III, pp. 590-93.) At trial, Johnson testified that
Silver Creek calculated the field yield (and corresponding Contract rate) for the Potatoes based
on the harvest weight and acreage of fields in which each variety was grown. (See Tr. Vol. I, p.
253, L. 7 top. 259, L. 25.) Silver Creek put in evidence the weight tickets from each load of the
Potatoes that was shipped out in the spring. (Plaintiffs Exhibits 1-2.) Johnson testified that the
shipped Potatoes were sorted in the fall when placed in the cellars (removing the over/under size
potatoes), and that no more than five percent of the shipped Potatoes were outside of the
Contract's size requirements. (See Tr. Vol. I., p. 261, L. 21 top. 272, L. 21.) Accordingly, there
was evidence that the Potatoes depicted on Plaintiffs Exhibits 1 and 2 meet the Contract's size
requirements. (See Plaintiffs Exhibit 5, p. 2.) Finally, Silver Creek provided evidence of the
payments it received for the Potatoes. (Plaintiffs Exhibit 3.)
The foregoing evidence furnished data which, if believed, made it possible to compute
the amount owed to Silver Creek with exactness and without reliance on opinion or discretion.
Further, it is apparent from the jury's verdict that it believed that evidence. Using that accepted
evidence, a simple mathematical computation can ascertain the amount due to Silver Creek under
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the Contract-which was exactly what was done in this case. The District Court and the jury
determined that, pursuant to the Contract, Sunrain owed Silver Creek $697,859.06 for potatoes
grown by Silver Creek during the 2012 crop year. (R. Vol. IV, p. 604.) That sum was calculated
by taking the weight of the potatoes shipped pursuant to the Contract 18 multiplied by the
applicable rate contained in the Contract 19 (totaling $1,139,936.10), subtracting the amount of
payments received by Silver Creek20 (totaling $379,197.34), and subtracting the cost of potatoes
received by Silver Creek in May, 2013 21 (totaling $62,879.70).
On the issue of when the sum became due, the Contract provides that the Sunrain would
make full payment for loads of seed potatoes within thirty days after delivery of those potatoes.
(Plaintiff's Exhibit 5, p. 2.) As shown by the weight tickets and bills oflading entered into
evidence, the last load of Potatoes was delivered by June 14, 2013. (See Plaintiff's Exhibit 1-2.)
Because all loads of Potatoes were delivered before that date, the entire outstanding balance was
due and owing to Silver Creek by July 14, 2013. Additionally, all payments made by Sunrain to
Silver Creek, and the delivery by Sunrain to Silver Creek of the 2013 seed (the $62,879.70 offset
applied by the Court to the jury's verdict), both occurred prior to June 14, 2013. (Plaintiff's
Exhibit 3; Defendant's Exhibit A.) As a result, the entire outstanding balance of $697,859.06
was due by July 14, 2013 and began to accrue prejudgment interest as of that date. 22
With regards to arguments that prejudgment interest could not start until after the trial

18

The weight of the Potatoes shipped pursuant to the Contract was contained in Plaintiffs Exhibit 1 and Exhibit 2.
The rate for the Potatoes was set forth in Plaintiffs Exhibit 1, Exhibit 2, and Exhibit 5, and supported by
Johnson's testimony at trial.
20 The payments received were shown on Plaintiffs Exhibit 3.
21 The amounts owed for the seed potatoes received by Silver Creek in May, 2013 were shown on Defendant's
Exhibit A and to be offset from the greater amount owed to Silver Creek. (See R. Vol. VI, p.604.)
22 As a technical matter, Sunrain would owe more prejudgment interest than was claimed by Silver Creek due to the
fact that some of the Potatoes were delivered prior to June 14, 2013 and the some of the payments Silver Creek
received for the Potatoes were received after June 14, 2013. However, for the ease of calculation, Silver Creek
simply requested prejudgment interest based upon the later due date of July 14, 2013. (See R. Vol. III, p. 594-98.)
19
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(based on assertions that the amount of conforming and/or accepted Potatoes was not known
until after the jury verdict), such arguments are untenable. The Potatoes were never certified
because certification is not complete until after the final inspection that takes place at shipping.
After BRR was found in the Infected Potatoes, Sunrain decided that it would take the Potatoes
and sell them as cattle feed. Because the Potatoes were being sold as cattle feed there was no
need for them to complete the certification process, and neither party sought, or demanded, that
the certification process for those Potatoes be further pursued. Sunrain cannot now claim that
because it chose to haul off the Potatoes without requiring them to be certified that Silver Creek
should be faulted for the lack of final certification. This Court has ruled that a party cannot
deviate from a contract then use that deviation as a defense to the award of prejudgment interest.

See Dillon, 138 Idaho at 618, 67 P.3d at 91.
As set forth above, an award of prejudgment interest is proper this case. The District
Court recognized that the evidence, believed by the jury, required only a simple mathematical
calculation to determine the amounts due to Silver Creek under the Contract. (Tr. Vol. II, p. 12
p. 12, L. 19 top 14, L. 5.) The District Judge exercised his discretion to compute the amount of
prejudgment interest and add it to the jury's verdict. (See Tr. Vol. II, p. 14, LL 18-25 .)

Based

on the foregoing, the District Court did not err by awarding Silver Creek prejudgment interest.

6. Did the District Court err by awarding Silver Creek costs and attorney fees?
Silver Creek sought costs and attorney fees, pursuant the Contract, I.R.C.P. 54(d)(l) and
54(e)(l), and Idaho Code§ 12-120, as the prevailing party in this matter. (R. Vol. VI, pp. 681751.) A district court's determination of prevailing party status is committed is a discretionary
decision that will not be disturbed absent an abuse of that discretion. Jorgensen v. Coppedge,
148 Idaho 536,538,224 P.3d 1125, 1127 (2010).
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I.R.C.P. 54(d)(l)(B) provides the following regarding determining the prevailing party:
In determining which party to an action is a prevailing party and entitled to costs,
the trial court shall in its sound discretion consider the final judgment or result of
the action in relation to the relief sought by the respective parties.
When an action involves multiple claims, issues, counterclaims, etc. between the parties, the
mere fact that a party is successful in asserting a single claim does not render that party a
prevailing party for purposes of determining whether to award costs and attorney fees. Chenery,
106 Idaho at 693,682 P.2d at 646. Rather, the Court takes an overall-view to determine the
prevailing party "in the action" for purposes of awarding costs and attorney fees. Id.; Lickley,
13 3 Idaho 209, 984 P .2d 697 (where the most significant issue in the case was whether the
plaintiff was entitled to the market price for rejectable potatoes, and the plaintiff prevailed on
that issue, the plaintiff was entitled to fees and costs).
In the present case, Silver Creek clearly prevailed in the action. Silver Creek asserted
three separate causes of action, prevailing on each. Further, the jury answered each question on
the Jury Verdict Form in Silver Creek's favor, as well as awarded Silver Creek the entire amount
of damages that it sought. With regards to Sunrain's two counterclaims, the jury expressly found
against Sunrain regarding the 2012 seed, and the District Court acknowledged Silver Creek's
right to properly offset the amount of the 2013 seed against the greater amount that Sunrain owed
to Silver Creek. Accordingly, Silver Creek prevailed on all issues in this case, and the ultimate
verdict and judgment plainly showcased that Silver Creek was the prevailing party.
Silver Creek was not required to specifically plead the right to costs and fees under the
Contract in order for them to be awarded. I.R.C.P. 54(e)(4) provides, "It shall not be necessary
for any party in a civil action to assert a claim for attorney fees in any pleading." Further, this
Court has held that "a party need not have listed a specific attorney fee provision in its pleading
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in order to obtain a fee award under that provision upon prevailing in the litigation." Eighteen
Mile Ranch, LLC v. Nord Excavating & Paving, Inc., 141 Idaho 716, 721, 117 P.3d 130, 135
(2005). Finally, when the parties' contract provides for the prevailing party to recover its
"actual" costs and fees incurred in the matter, it is proper for the trial court to award actual costs
to the prevailing party pursuant to the contract without reference to the reasonableness factors
contained in Rule 54(e)(3). Zenner v. Holcomb, 147 Idaho 444,452,210 P.3d 552, 560 (2009).
In its Motion and Memorandum of Costs and Attorney Fees, Silver Creek requested its
actual costs and attorney fees pursuant to the Contract. (See R. Vol. IV, pp. 606-80.). The
Contract provides:
Should any litigation be commenced between the parties concerning this
Agreement and the rights and duties of the parties in relation thereto ... the
prevailing party shall be entitled to recover actual attorney fees and costs incurred
in such litigation.
(Plaintiff's Exhibit 5, pp. 2-3) (emphases added). This unambiguous provision allows for the
prevailing party to recover its actual costs and fees incurred, and must be construed most
strongly against Sunrain as the drafter of the Contract. Zenner, 147 Idaho at 451,210 P.3d at
559. As noted above, Silver Creek prevailed on all disputed issues in this action. Consequently,
Silver Creek's actual costs and attorney fees were properly awarded under the Contract.
As for arguments of unconscionability, Sunrain never raised the defense below.
Nevertheless, the District Court specially considered whether the amounts claimed were
unconscionable. (R. Vol. IV, p. 790.) The District Court noted that the amounts claimed by
Silver Creek were billed, were paid, and were the actual fees incurred-and that based on those
reasons, the fees did not amount to an unconscionable penalty. (R. Vol. IV, p. 790.) Sunrain
has not provided any authority demonstrating that the District Court erred by so concluding.

7. Is Silver Creek entitled to costs and attorney fees on appeal?
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Silver Creek requests an award of costs incurred in responding to this appeal pursuant to
the Contract and Idaho law, including I.A.R. 40. Silver Creek also requests an award of attorney
fees incurred in defending this appeal pursuant to the Contract and Idaho law, including I.A.R.
41 and Idaho Code section 12-120.
The Contract provides that the prevailing party in any litigation relating to the Contract
shall be entitled to recover its actual attorney fees and costs incurred. (Plaintiffs Exhibit 5, pp.
2-3.) Silver Creek brought this action alleging Sunrain breached the Contract and that Silver
Creek was entitled to payment for the Potatoes at the rate contained in the Contract. (R. Vol. I.
pp. 15-25.) Silver Creek prevailed on its claims before the District Court, and if the District
Court's judgments are affirmed Silver Creek will have prevailed on appeal. In that situation,
Silver Creek would entitled to an award of its actual costs and attorney fees incurred on appeal.
Additionally, Idaho Code section 12-120(3) entitles the prevailing party actions arising
from a commercial transaction to an award of attorney fees. Commercial transactions are "all
transactions except transactions for personal or household purposes." Idaho Code§ 12-120(3).
Section 12-120(3) applies to proceedings before the trial court and those on appeal. Oakes v.
Boise Heart Clinic Physicians, PLLC, 152 Idaho 540,546,272 P.3d 512,518 (2012).
The present case clearly involved a commercial transaction. The Complaint and Demand
for Jury Trial arose from Sunrain's breach of a contract between two business entities regarding
the provision of seed potatoes for use in commercial planting and sale for a profit. (See R. Vol.
I, pp. 15-25.) A contract governing the purchase and sale by two business entities of hundreds
of thousands of pounds of seed potatoes for commercial planting is unquestionably not a
personal or household matter. Therefore, in the event Silver Creek is the prevailing party on
appeal, it is entitled to an award of attorney fees pursuant to Idaho Code section 12-120(3).
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VII.

CONCLUSION

Sunrain did not present this Court with adequate justification supporting its claims of
error. The District Court did not err by granting partial summary judgment to Silver Creek and
denying Sunrain's Motion for Reconsideration. At trial, the District Court did not err by
allowing Bragg to testify of BRR at Ebe Farms, nor by excluding portions of the Exhibits Ys
from evidence. Thereafter, the remaining issues were decided after a presentation of evidence
and deliberation by a properly instructed jury, which decisions are supported by substantial and
competent evidence. Prejudgment interest was properly allowed, and the award of costs and
attorney fees to Silver Creek was provided for by the law and supported by the record. Based on
the foregoing, Silver Creek respectfully requests that the District Court and the jury's decisions
be affirmed and that Silver Creek be awarded costs and attorney fees on appeal.
Oral argument is requested.
DATED thi~ day of February, 2016.
WRIGHT BROTHERS LAW OFFICE, PLL

~
By: _ _ _- ____ _ , , ~ - - - - - - Andre
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